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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge: 
 
We are here asked to decide whether an Assistant United 
States Attorney ("AUSA") may, without court approval, 
disclose grand jury information to an AUSA in another 
district for use in the performance of his duty to enforce 
federal criminal law. We must also determine whether the 
appellant, an attorney, is entitled to redact documents that 
he must produce to the grand jury so as to preserve the 




The United States Attorney for the District of New Jersey 
has been conducting a grand jury investigation, and 
appellant has become a subject of that investigation. 
According to the government, this investigation is not 
limited to the District of New Jersey and has required the 
coordinated effort and interaction of several United States 
Attorneys and their assistants in other districts. 
 
Appellant undertook representation of a client in federal 
criminal proceedings pending in another district. The 
United States Attorney's office in New Jersey, in the course 
of its grand jury investigation, received information about 
appellant which it reasonably believed revealed a conflict of 
interest between appellant and his/her client. In two 
letters, both of which appear to follow up on separate 
telephone conversations, an AUSA from New Jersey 
revealed this information to the AUSA having responsibility 
for the prosecution against the client in the other district. 
The AUSA receiving this information then filed a motion to 
have appellant disqualified from representing the client on 
the basis that the grand jury investigation and the 
information it revealed demonstrated a conflict of interest. 
The motion was denied and appellant represented the client 
at trial and continues to represent the client on appeal. 
 
After the client's conviction, a New Jersey grand jury 
issued a subpoena duces tecum to appellant's accountants. 
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The subpoena requested documents relating to appellant, 
the law firm in which he/she is a partner, and any entity 
to which he/she is related. Among the documents 
requested were copies of the firm's billing statements 
reflecting the names and accounts of many of appellant's 
clients. Appellant's accountants produced a substantial 
majority of these documents, but withheld the remainder of 
the documents, each of which contains names of the 
appellant's former or current clients. The government 
asserts that the withheld documents are needed to explain 
those documents that were produced and to give the 
government an accurate picture of appellant's finances.1 
 
Appellant moved in New Jersey for (1) a protective order 
preventing an AUSA in New Jersey from further disclosing 
grand jury information to an AUSA in any district other 
than New Jersey without first obtaining a court order, and 
(2) an order modifying the subpoena to permit the redaction 
of the names of appellant's clients. The District Court 




The government raises a threshold issue of jurisdiction. 
Appellant's notice of appeal was filed 53 days after the 
District Court's order denying appellant's motions was 
entered and the government contends that this was 
untimely under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(b). 
Rule 4(b) provides that "[i]n a criminal case, a defendant's 
notice of appeal must be filed in the district court within 10 
days . . . of . . . the entry of either the judgment or the 
order appealed. . . ." Fed.R.App.P. 4(b)(1)(A)(i). Appellant, on 
the other hand, insists that his/her application for relief 
was a civil case, and, under Rule 4(a)(1)(B), he/she had 60 
days from the entry of the District Court's order to file a 
notice of appeal.2 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. At this time, pursuant to an agreement between the AUSA in New 
Jersey and appellant's accountants, all of the documents that were 
previously withheld have been produced with the names of the 
appellant's clients redacted pending the resolution of this appeal. 
2. Rule 4(a)(1)(B) provides that "in a civil case . . . [w]hen the United 
States or its officer or agency is a party, the notice of appeal may be 
filed 
by any party within 60 days after the judgment or order appealed from 
is entered." Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)(1)(B). 
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We agree with appellant that his/her application to the 
District Court was a "civil case" within the meaning of Rule 
4. Accordingly, we conclude that we have jurisdiction over 
this appeal.3 
 
We spoke directly to this jurisdictional issue in United 
States v. Lavin, 942 F.2d 177 (3d Cir. 1991) where we held 
that the proceedings on a motion under 21 U.S.C.S 853(n) 
to modify a forfeiture order entered as a part of a criminal 
sentence constituted a "civil case" for purposes of Rule 4. 
We explained: 
 
        The term "criminal case" in Rule 4(b) generally is 
       construed narrowly to encompass only a "prosecution 
       brought by the government to secure a sentence of 
       conviction for criminal conduct." Conversely, the term 
       "civil case" in Rule 4(a)(1) generally is construed 
       broadly to include "any action that is not a criminal 
       prosecution." As a result, proceedings that essentially 
       are civil in nature are deemed to be "civil cases," even 
       though they derive from a prior criminal prosecution. 
 
       * * * 
 
        Applying these principles to the case at bar, we are 
       convinced that a proceeding under 21 U.S.C. S 853(h) 
       . . . is a "civil case" for purposes of Rule 4(a)(1). As the 
       government concedes, a hearing to adjudicate the 
       validity of a third party's interest in forfeited property 
       is not a criminal prosecution, i.e., an action 
       commenced by the government to secure a sentence of 
       conviction for criminal conduct. 
 
Id. at 181-82 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis in 
original). Our reading of Rule 4 in Lavin is, of course, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Normally, an order declining to quash or narrow a subpoena is not a 
final appealable order absent disobedience and a contempt citation. 
However, "when a party, other than the one to whom a subpoena has 
been addressed, moves to quash the subpoena, the denial of his motion 
disposes of his claims fully and finally," it being unreasonable to expect 
that a third party will risk contempt in order to facilitate immediate 
review. In re Grand Jury, 619 F.2d 1022, 1025 (3d Cir. 1980). 
Accordingly, the order currently before us is final for purposes of 
appellate review. 
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consistent with the fact that Rule 4(b), dealing with 
"criminal cases" speaks only of appeals by"defendants." 
See also Lee v. Johnson, 799 F.2d 31, 36-37 (3d Cir. 1986) 
(For purposes of the Equal Access to Justice Act, it is the 
purpose of the proceeding that determines whether it is 
civil or criminal. Thus, "a contempt proceeding aimed at 
coercing compliance with a grand jury proceeding is civil in 
nature . . . . A contempt proceeding aimed not at coercing 
compliance but at punishing a condemnor for past defiance 
of the process of the court is criminal in nature."). 
 
While it is true that we have characterized grand jury 
proceedings as criminal in nature, See, e.g., In re Grand 
Jury Empanelled February 14, 1978, 597 F.2d 851 (3d Cir. 
1979), this is not determinative under our reading of Rule 
4 in Lavin. While appellant's motion was made in the 
context of a grand jury proceeding, just as the motion in 
Lavin was made in the context of a criminal action, 
proceedings on that motion were clearly not proceedings by 
the government to secure a sentence of conviction for 
criminal conduct. Accordingly, those proceedings were 




The government also objects to our entertaining this 
appeal on the ground that appellant lacks standing to seek 
either an injunction against further inter-district 
disclosures of grand jury materials without a court order or 
modification of the subpoena. We disagree. 
 
Appellant is a subject of the grand jury investigation and 
the allegedly unauthorized disclosures consist of 
information about him/her obtained in the course of that 
investigation. Among the interests protected by grand jury 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. In holding, as we do, that a motion to modify a subpoena is a civil 
case within the meaning of Rule 4, we take a different view than two of 
our sister circuits that have passed on the issue. See In re Grand Jury 
Subpoenas 89-3 and 89-4, 902 F.2d 244, 247 (4th Cir. 1990); In re 
Grand Jury Proceedings (Company X), 835 F.2d 237 (10th Cir. 1987) (per 
curiam). But see In Re Grand Jury Proceedings (Manges), 745 F.2d 1250, 
1251 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that appeals from orders concerning grand 
jury subpoenas are civil actions governed by Fed.R.App.P. 4(a)). 
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secrecy is the privacy interest of an investigation's subjects. 
Douglas Oil Co. of Cal. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 
211, 218 n. 8 (1979). If one in appellant's position does not 
have standing to complain about unauthorized disclosures, 
we fail to perceive how it would ever be possible to enforce 
the rule of grand jury secrecy. 
 
Standing to seek a modification of the subpoena presents 
a different issue, but our conclusion must be the same. 
Although the documents that are the subject of appellant's 
motion for modification of the subpoena are in the hands of 
appellant's accountants, they nevertheless belong to 
appellant's firm. We have previously held that one who has 
a property interest in the subject matter of a grand jury 
subpoena has standing to challenge the subpoena and we 
so hold here. See In re Grand Jury, 619 F.2d 1022, 1026 
(3d Cir. 1980). This does not, of course, mean that 
appellant's property interest will not have to yield to the 
grand jury's interest in reviewing the documents, but that 
is a merits issue. See id. Appellant has standing to attempt 
to narrow the subpoena as well as to seek protection 
against further inter-district disclosures. Accordingly, we 




Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e)(2) provides the 
general rule with respect to grand jury secrecy: 
 
        (2) General Rule of Secrecy. A grand juror, an 
       interpreter, a stenographer, an operator of a recording 
       device, a typist who transcribes recorded testimony, an 
       attorney for the government, or any person to whom 
       disclosure is made under paragraph (3)(A)(ii) of this 
       subdivision shall not disclose matters occurring before 
       the grand jury, except as otherwise provided for in 
       these rules. . . . A knowing violation of Rule 6 may be 
       punished as a contempt of court. 
 
Subsection (e)(3) provides exceptions to the general rule 
of non-disclosure: 
 
        (3) Exceptions. 
 
        (A) Disclosure . . . may be made to -- 
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         (i) an attorney for the government for use  in the 
       performance of such attorney's duty; and 
 
         (ii) such government personnel (including 
       personnel of a state or subdivision of a state) as are 
       deemed necessary by an attorney for the government 
       to assist an attorney for the government in the 
       performance of such attorney's duty to enforce 
       federal criminal law. 
 
Subsection (e)(3)(C) provides four additional exceptions, 
three of which involve court approval and are not relevant 
here. The fourth is significant in the current context: 
 
        (C) Disclosure . . . may also be made -- 
 
        (iii) when the disclosure is made by an attorney for 
       the government to another federal grand jury. 
 
An "attorney for the government" for the purposes of Rule 
6 includes "the Attorney General, an authorized assistant of 
the Attorney General, a United States Attorney,[and] an 
authorized assistant of a United States Attorney." 
Fed.R.Crim.P. 54(c). 
 
In United States v. Sells Engineering, Inc., 463 U.S. 418 
(1983), the Supreme Court held that Rule 6(e)(3)(A)(i) does 
not authorize disclosure without court approval to an 
attorney for the government for use in a civil proceeding. 
See id. at 442. In the course of so holding, the Court 
reviewed the history of Rule 6 and the practice under 
subsection (A)(i). Subsection (A)(i) was originally enacted in 
1944; subsection (A)(ii) was added in 1977. Despite the 
disparity in the text of subsections (A)(i) and (A)(ii), the 
Court concluded that the purposes for which disclosure 
may be made to a government attorney and to other 
government personnel are the same. The Court found that 
when Congress, in 1977, inserted the clause "duty to 
enforce federal criminal law," in subsection (A)(ii), "it was 
merely making explicit what it believed to be already 
implicit in the existing (A)(i) language." Id. at 436. Thus, it 
is clear that the authority granted by subsection (A)(i) is 
authority for disclosure to "an attorney for the government 
for use in the performance of such attorney's duty to 
enforce federal criminal law." 
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Appellant urges us to find implicit in subsection (A)(i) a 
limitation restricting disclosures by one AUSA to another 
for use in the performance of the latter's criminal law 
enforcement duties to intra-district communications. We 
decline to do so. Rather, we will follow the Supreme Court's 
advice in United States v. John Doe Inc. 1, 481 U.S. 102, 
109 (1987) and "accept . . . Rule [6] as meaning what it 
says." The text of subsection (A)(i) authorizes an AUSA to 
disclose grand jury material to another AUSA "for use in 
the performance of such attorney's [criminal] duties" 
without regard to his or her location. There is no dispute 
here that the disclosure to the receiving AUSA was for use 
in the performance of his/her criminal law enforcement 
duties, and we, accordingly, can find no fault with the 
conduct of the government in this matter. 
 
The only argument appellant can mount in the face of the 
plain meaning of subsection (A)(i) is based on the manner 
in which the Supreme Court summarized its holding in 
Sells Engineering and a comment in a footnote in the 
Court's opinion there. The Court summarized its holding as 
follows: "We hold that (A)(i) disclosure is limited to use by 
those attorneys who conduct the criminal matters to which 
the materials pertain." Sells Eng'g, 463 U.S. at 427. 
Footnote 11 observes that the legislative history shows 
"fairly clearly that the reason why it was thought desirable 
to allow disclosure to other prosecutors was to facilitate 
effective working of the prosecution team." Id. at 429 n.11. 
(emphasis in original). Appellant concludes from these 
portions of Sells Engineering that (A)(i) disclosures are 
limited to members of the "team" prosecuting the particular 
matter that produced the grand jury information that was 
disclosed. 
 
We take a different view of the segments of Sells 
Engineering that appellant emphasizes. First, the purpose 
of both was to distinguish between use by the receiving 
attorney for criminal law enforcement purposes and use by 
him in civil proceedings. The issue of whether the (A)(i) 
authorization is limited to some subset of disclosures to 
government attorneys for use in criminal law enforcement 
was not before the court, and, in context, it is clear that 
neither of these statements was intended to express a view 
on that subject. 
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Moreover, we believe appellant's reading of these portions 
of Sells Engineering is unduly restrictive. Disclosures 
among prosecutors working on the same prosecution is, of 
course, the paradigm situation in which securing court 
approval would be prohibitively burdensome, and the 
drafters did, indeed, intend "to facilitate the effective 
working of [such a] prosecution team." See id. However, this 
does not mean the Supreme Court's reference to the 
legislative history was intended to limit the (A)(i) 
authorization to such a narrow range of disclosures. On the 
contrary, the Court's summary of its holding is not limited 
to disclosures between attorneys working on the same 
matter. Rather, it speaks of "matters" and authorizes 
disclosures to all "attorneys who conduct the criminal 
matters to which the materials pertain." Id. at 427 
(emphasis supplied). This would seem to us to include any 
government attorneys conducting other criminal matters to 
which the materials disclosed are relevant. Thus, when 
carefully parsed, we find the Court's summary entirely 
consistent with the authority granted by a straight forward 
reading of the text -- the authority to disclose to any 
attorney for the government for use in the performance of 
his duty to enforce federal criminal law. 
 
Finally, we note that nothing in the Sells Engineering 
opinion supports the notion that subsection (A)(i) contains 
a geographic limitation. To the contrary, all members of the 
Court seemed in agreement, for example, that disclosures 
to supervisors at Main Justice in the District of Columbia 
were authorized by subsection (A)(i). 
 
We also conclude that recognizing appellant's geographic 
limitation on the authority granted by subsection (A)(i) 
would be difficult to reconcile with the absence of any 
similar limitation in subsection (C)(iii). As we have noted, 
subsection (C)(iii), which was added to Rule 6(e) in 1983, 
provides explicit authorization for a disclosure"by an 
attorney for the government [without court approval] to 
another federal grand jury." Fed.R.Crim.P. 6(e)(3)(C)(iii). 
This express authority contains no geographic limitation; 
on its face it authorizes disclosures to grand juries in other 
districts as well as successive grand juries in the same 
district. 
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The Advisory Committee's Note indicates that absence of 
such a geographic limitation was deliberate. The rationale 
behind the authority conveyed, as described in the Note, 
was that the "[s]ecrecy of grand jury materials should be 
protected almost as well by the safeguards at the second 
grand jury proceedings, including the oath of jurors, as by 
judicial supervision of the disclosure of such materials." 
Fed.R.Crim.P. 6(e)(3)(C)(iii) Advisory Committee Notes, 1983 
amendments (quoting United States v. Malatesta , 583 F.2d 
748 (5th Cir. 1978)). In addition to thus identifying a 
rationale applicable to inter-district disclosures to a grand 
jury as well as to intra-district ones, the Advisory Note also 
indicates that subsection (C)(iii) was consistent with the few 
prior cases that had considered the propriety of disclosures 
to other grand juries in the absence of authority in the 
rules. Prominent among the cases reflecting that 
"preexisting practice" was the decision of the Fourth Circuit 
Court of Appeals in United States v. Penrod, 609 F.2d 1092 
(4th Cir. 1979) which approved a disclosure of information 
secured by a grand jury in the Eastern District of Virginia 
to a grand jury sitting in the District of Columbia. 
 
Subsection (C)(iii) thus reflects a Congressional desire to 
expedite and facilitate the use of one grand jury's 
information by other grand juries investigating other 
crimes. We can perceive no reason why Congress would 
have endorsed this inter-district use of grand jury 
information without a court order while requiring a court 
order for the inter-district disclosure of grand jury 
information to the same AUSA who would be assisting the 
receiving grand jury. In short, we are confident that 
Congress, in 1983, viewed the preexisting subsection (A)(i) 
and the new (C)(iii) to be complementary because it 
understood that (A)(i), in accordance with its text, already 
contained authority for inter-district disclosures without a 
court order to government attorneys for use in criminal law 
enforcement. 
 
Federal crimes often involve inter-district activities and, 
as a result, grand jury investigations conducted by United 
States Attorneys often involve more than one district. 
Moreover, while investigations in different districts may 
initially appear unrelated, investigators frequently uncover 
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information showing them to be closely linked. Accordingly, 
cooperation between United States Attorney's offices is 
essential to the effective enforcement of federal criminal 
laws. In fast moving investigations, delays in that 
cooperation can exact a heavy toll. Congress apparently 
determined that inter-district disclosures between AUSAs in 
support of their criminal law enforcement responsibilities, 
but without court supervision, could materially increase the 
efficiency of criminal law enforcement efforts without 
jeopardizing the interests that grand jury secrecy seeks to 
protect. Those interests, as identified by the Supreme 
Court, include: (1) preserving the willingness and candor of 
witnesses called before the grand jury; (2) maintaining the 
integrity of the investigations so that targets will not be 
afforded an opportunity to flee or interfere with the grand 
jury; and (3) preserving the rights of a suspect who might 
later be exonerated. See Douglas Oil Co., 441 U.S. at 218- 
19. None of these interests are likely to be compromised by 
the transmission of grand jury material without a court 
order from one AUSA to another in furtherance of their 
criminal law enforcement duties, regardless of the district 
in which the receiving AUSA practices. Rule 6(e)(2) requires 
that all AUSAs, regardless of the district in which they 
serve, maintain the secrecy of grand jury information. 
Thus, as in the case of subsection (C)(iii) disclosures to the 
members of a second grand jury, the recipient of a 
disclosure pursuant to subsection (A)(i) will be subject to 





Rule 17(c) provides that a "court on motion made 
promptly may quash or modify [a] subpoena if compliance 
would be unreasonable or oppressive." The burden of 
production and the burden of persuasion to show that a 
subpoena was unreasonable lies with the party resisting it. 
United States v. R. Enterprises, Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 301 
(1991). We review a District Court's decision under Rule 
17(c) for an abuse of discretion only. See United States v. 
Berrigan, 482 F.2d 171, 181 (3d Cir. 1973). 
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We agree with appellant that a "district court may, under 
Fed.R.Crim.P. 17(c), quash or modify a subpoena duces 
tecum independent of a finding of privilege where the 
subpoena is unreasonable." Appellant's Br. p. 26. Appellant 
has failed to show, however, that the subpoena in its 
present form is unreasonable, oppressive, or improper in 
any other way. Contrary to the appellant's assertion, there 
has been no "showing of irregularity" that would shift to the 
government the burden of demonstrating the subpoena's 
reasonableness. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings 
(Johanson), 632 F.2d 1033, 1041-42 (3d Cir. 1980). 




The District Court's Order of May 17, 2001, will be 
affirmed. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
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